10 ideas
7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
20653 | Six reduction levels: groups, lives, cells, molecules, atoms, particles [Putnam/Oppenheim, by Watson] |
9074 | Abstraction cannot produce the concept of a 'game', as there is no one common feature [Barnes,J] |
9073 | Abstraction from an ambiguous concept like 'mole' will define them as the same [Barnes,J] |
9072 | Defining concepts by abstractions will collect together far too many attributes from entities [Barnes,J] |